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Abstract. Middle Eastern (Omani) and Western (U.S.) students’ beliefs about knowledge and
knowing in the sciences were compared on four dimensions of personal epistemology proposed
by Hofer and Pintrich (Review of Educational Research (1997), 67, 88–140). As predicted, given
their experiences with comparatively traditional political and religious institutions, Omani
more so than U.S. college students were more likely to accept scientific authorities as the
basis of scientific truth. Furthermore, Omani men were more accepting of authorities than
were Omani women, but there was no gender difference among U.S. students. Omani more
than U.S. students also believed that knowledge in the sciences was simpler and more cer-
tain, which is consistent with comparisons between U.S. and Asian students (e.g., Qian &
Pan, 2002, A comparision of epistemological beliefs and learning from science text between
American and Chinese high school students. In B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal
epistomology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing (pp. 365–385), Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum). Students in the two countries did not differ, however, in whether their beliefs
were based on personal opinions versus systematic evidence. Suggestions for further research
included directly assessing experiences with, and attitudes toward, authorities in academic and
other areas of students’ lives.
1. Introduction
Whether and in what ways culture influences personal epistemology – indi-
viduals’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing – is part of the
broader effort to understand associations between culture and cognition.
Considerable progress toward that understanding comes from comparisons
between Western and Asian cultures. Such comparisons are particularly
compelling because of clearly distinguishable, long-standing philosophi-
cal and religious traditions (Nisbett, 2003). Likewise, cross-cultural stud-
ies of personal epistemology thus far have examined differences between
Western and Asian cultures as well as comparisons within and between
Western countries (Alexander & Douchy, 1995; Chan & Elliott, 2002;
Jacobson, Jehng, & Maouri, 1997; McDevitt, Sheehan, Cooney, Smith,
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& Walker, 1994; Mason & Castiglioni, 2000; Qian & Pan, 2002; Youn,
2000). Research on culture and cognition has implications for many social,
self, and educational processes (e.g., Feather, 1993; Nisbett, 2003; Volet &
Järvelä, 2001), including the role of authority (Feather & McKee, 1993;
Raviv, Bar-Tal, & Raviv, 2003).
By contrast, there is little systematic evidence regarding the applica-
bility of Western conceptualizations of personal epistemology to Mid-
dle Eastern Muslim cultures, or to comparisons between Western and
Middle Eastern Muslim cultures.1 Studies of Middle Eastern popula-
tions, for example, are noticeably absent from the extensive literature on
individualism–collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 1995). In addition to the impor-
tance of Middle Eastern societies, both historically and in view of con-
temporary political and social events as well as their comprising a sizable
proportion of the world’s population, features of Middle Eastern societies
are eminently suitable for examining relations between culture and cogni-
tion in general, and culture and epistemic beliefs in particular.
In the case of Middle Eastern societies, although there is considerable
variation among countries in the region, a prominent feature consists
of relatively authoritarian political-religious vertically collective cultures
(Triandis, 1995) in which the political and social discourse involves status
and power differences. At issue is whether such cultural characteris-
tics, which involve how society members relate to one another, trans-
late into beliefs about knowledge and knowing. The connection between
general culture-based interpersonal relations and learning is predicted by
Schommer-Aikins’s (2004) embedded systemic model of epistemic beliefs.
According to this model, one’s cultural relational views have important
implications for learning (especially classroom learning) to the extent they
reinforce asymmetrical hierarchical relationships with experts. Given cul-
turally based experiences with asymmetry, learners are more likely to
accept omniscient authority-based claims, a predominant feature of less
sophisticated epistemological beliefs (Baxter-Magolda, 1992, 2004; Belenky,
Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986; Hofer, 2002; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997;
Perry, 1970). Support for this view thus far is based on evidence obtained
in Western societies. The present study examined whether cultural differ-
ences in authority relations would be reflected in epistemic beliefs.
Authority-related cultural characteristics may have influences that extend
beyond acceptance of expert knowledge claims to involve the range of per-
sonal epistemic beliefs (also referred to as personal theories) proposed by
Hofer and Pintrich (1997; Hofer, 2002, 2004). These core beliefs consist
of four dimensions: (a) knowledge is simple versus complex, (b) knowl-
edge is certain versus in a state of flux, (c) whether knowing is justi-
fied on the basis of dualistic, multiplistic opinions, or evaluative standards
of evidence, as well as (d) the degree of reliance on authority to judge
the veracity of knowledge claims. This dimensional approach (see also
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Schommer-Aikins, 2002) recognizes that learners’ beliefs are relatively inde-
pendent and need not develop synchronously. For example, students in
a beginning physics course may believe that knowledge is complex and
interrelated (considered a relatively sophisticated epistemic belief) but also
unchanging (considered a less mature belief). Further, the profile of episte-
mic beliefs may vary by knowledge domain – beliefs about physics versus
history – or involve some combination of domain-specific and generalized
epistemic beliefs (Hofer, 2000). Beliefs also depend on how specific or gen-
eral is the reference domain, for example, knowledge in general, a scien-
tific domain such as biology, or a specific area of research and theory (e.g.,
quantum mechanics).
The domain of knowledge is thus critical when examining cultural
differences, and must minimize potential confounding effects of content
differences. Comparing epistemic beliefs about world history in two cul-
tures, for example, would confront likely differences in how that history
was portrayed. Similar confounding would be least probable with for-
mal disciplines such as mathematics or logic. However, such formal disci-
plines do not involve evidence-based claims, which are prominent epistemic
concerns. Accordingly, science was selected as an appropriate referent for
the present study primarily because there is relatively comparable content
among widely varying educational systems, and it has been the domain
of choice in previous research (Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 2002). The
present study thus consisted of a cross-national comparison between college
students’ epistemic beliefs regarding science in one Middle Eastern Muslim
country, the Sultanate of Oman, with those of U.S. college students, who
exemplify the consequences of Western cultural influences. At issue here is
whether, and in what manner, Omani and U.S. college students are similar
or differ on the proposed four dimensions of epistemic beliefs that would
be expected based on their cultural context. We begin by describing domi-
nant features of Omani culture and their potential for shaping those beliefs,
recognizing at the outset the considerable heterogeneity within that society
that undoubtedly exists as well.2
Similar to other countries in the region, Omani society is highly struc-
tured, both politically and religiously. Politically, it is a long-standing mon-
archy; the Sultan is head of state, the highest and final authority, and the
supreme commander of the armed forces. There have been some democra-
tizing trends, however. Created by Royal Decree in 1997, the basic statute
of the state established the Council of Oman. The Council is a bicameral
legislature with the Majlis a Shura (Consultative Council), whose members
are elected by Omani citizens, and the Majlis Al Dawla (State Council),
whose members are appointed by the Sultan. Islam, the state religion exerts
profound influence over most aspects of Omani society in that the Quran
prescribes politics, economics, law and justice, and social behavior, as well
as theology. Most Omanis are Ibadhi, with a minority adhering to Sunni
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or Shia Islam. The legal system is based on both English common law and
Islamic law. As in other Muslim countries, relationships between secular
and religious law and the courts are complex. Religious conflicts have not
been prominent in Oman, however, which extends tolerance both to Mus-
lims and non-Muslims. The ministry of Awqaf and religious affairs, which
promotes the role of Islam in Omani society, provides the imams of the
mosques with general guidelines that encourage unity among Muslims in
Oman and other places.
As in other Moslem countries, tradition plays a significant role that affects
women’s social and economic destinies. Although from the very outset of his
reign Sultan Qaboos resolved that Omani women should not be marginalized
in the new modern Sultanate, and many laws and regulations were issued pur-
suant to that goal, women continue to face obstacles. Illiteracy among older
women hampers their ability to participate in many sectors of the society.
Data on the educational status of the adult Omani population also reveals
that for those older than 15 years, Omani women are less highly educated
than are Omani men. At the same time, however, overall educational lev-
els have been rising with significant improvement in the educational status
of women (Rassekh, 2004). Comparative enrollments of boys and girls also
indicate progress in reducing the gender gap with only a slight difference
in the net enrollment ratios. Thus, education is one area in which there is
greater equity. Ninety percent of all girls who are eligible attend elemen-
tary school; they also represent half of the students attending public schools,
approximately half of the students at Sultan Qaboos University, and they
generally receive half of the government grants to study abroad. The govern-
ment also encourages Omani women to contribute to the national economy
as working women, and the Ministry of Social Development provides sup-
port for women’s affairs to improve the quality of life for their families and
to improve their contributions to the community.
Thus Oman is a relatively hierarchical Islamic country that has endeav-
ored to keep pace with global development and to advance women’s
socio-economic roles while adhering to traditional religious norms, values,
and cultural customs. Albeit with liberalizing segments within the society,
embedded traditions and customs continue, and women still face certain
obstacles in their social, political, and economic lives. This contrasts with
the majority of Western cultures, such as the U.S., which is highly individ-
ualistic and anti-authoritarian (e.g., Jacobson et al., 1997; Triandis, 1995),
including greater (although not total) gender equity. Given that gender is
inextricably woven into the more traditional culture of Oman we would
expect differences between men and woman on gender-related cultural vari-
ables. Such differences should, however, be less evident in more gender
egalitarian Western cultures. The present study focused on whether and
in what manner these cultural differences potentially transfer to students’
personal epistemic beliefs.
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The predominant features of Omani culture, politics, and religion thus
appear to have considerable relevance for epistemic beliefs related to
authority. Specifically, we would expect that Omani more so than U.S. stu-
dents would trust and accede to authorities in many areas. As suggested by
Schommer-Aikins’s (2004) embedded systemic model, experiences with hier-
archical interpersonal relations should translate to acceptance of authority
claims in evidence-based knowledge domains such as science. Predictions
are not as straightforward, however, regarding gender differences in Oman.
One possibility is that because Omani men are more involved in the reli-
gious and political life of the country they may be more empowered and
rely less on authorities as sources of knowledge than would Omani women
who are subject to greater restrictions and dictates based on tradition. Just
as plausibly, however, Omani males’ greater exposure to cultural author-
ities could render them more, rather than less, susceptible to authority,
whereas highly achieving and selected Omani college women who have
transcended culturally based gender restrictions would be less reliant on
authority. Whereas gender is important in Omani society, whether and how
this translates to epistemic beliefs about knowledge and knowing in science
in particular remains to be determined. By contrast, in the U.S., because of
greater equity in many areas, including the sciences, gender differences with
respect to authority should be less evident.
Although there have been no previous cross-national comparisons
between the epistemic beliefs of Arab Muslim and U.S. students, Al-Salhi
(2001) provides the most relevant source of information in his exami-
nation of Saudi college students matriculating in science and religious
studies. Using an adapted version of Schommer’s (1990) Epistemologi-
cal Beliefs Questionnaire, translated into Arabic, Al-Salhi identified two
dimensions (factors): active learning and simple/certain knowledge. Of the
two, simple/certain knowledge was more easily interpretable. An examina-
tion of the constituent items, however, suggests that the second dimen-
sion is more aptly described as a combination of simple/certain knowledge
and acceptance of authority. Al-Salhi found that male students of religion
scored higher on the simple/certain (and authority) dimension than did
female religion students, but male and female science students did not dif-
fer. Consistently, by a large margin, both for those in science and religion
curricula, male more so than female students listed “trust in the source”
when asked how they judged the truth of claims. To the extent Saudi stu-
dents are comparable, these results suggests that Omani men more so than
women may be more accepting of authority.
Implications of Middle Eastern culture for whether scientific knowledge
is simple and certain, and the extent that justification is based on opinion
or evaluated according to agreed-upon standards, is less clear given what
is known at this point. Because of suggestions that Omani teachers place
considerable emphasis on repetition and memorization (Rassekh, 2004),
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however, we may expect Omani more so than U.S. students to believe more
strongly that knowledge is simple and certain. This would be consistent
with evidence from Asian samples, which suggests that U.S. students are
less likely to hold such beliefs (Qian & Pan, 2002).
To summarize, Omani and U.S. college students responded to a survey
designed to assess personal epistemic beliefs about knowledge (simple and
certain) and knowing (justification and source) in science. As noted ear-
lier, we focused on science because this domain of knowledge is likely to be
equivalent and well defined in the two countries. Omani students responded
to an Arabic translation of the survey in order to eliminate differences
in familiarity with English. Although a necessary component of the study,
dimensionality of the epistemological cognitions in the two cultures was
not of central interest. Rather, we focused on the development of scales
that to the extent possible were equivalent in meaning and psychometric
properties. It should be noted that the present study involved both level
and structural predictions (see van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). We predicted
there would be level differences in the degree of acceptance of authority:
higher in Oman than in the U.S. Structural differences were expected in
that the relationships between authority and gender were predicted to vary
across cultures, specifically that gender and authority would be related in
Oman but not in the U.S.
2. Method
2.1. SURVEY FORMAT
Both the U.S. and Oman versions of the epistemology questionnaire were
introduced as “concerned with how students view knowledge and know-
ing.” An informed consent statement reinforced that completion of the sur-
vey was voluntary and anonymous and stressed to students that neither
their teachers nor anyone at their university would see their responses. The
Oman version, completely in Arabic, assessed students’ epistemic beliefs
and obtained demographic and education-related information: gender, year
in college, major or intended major, grade point average and kind and
number of high school and college science courses they had taken. In
the U.S., the epistemology questionnaire was one component of a larger
study (the second of five sections) that was introduced as concerned with
students’ beliefs, attitudes and understanding of scientific information.
2.2. EPISTEMIC BELIEFS
The epistemology survey itself consisted of 35 statements to which
respondents indicated their level of agreement using a 5-point Likert
scale response format (strongly disagree to strongly agree). As discussed
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previously, we framed the survey to reflect students’ beliefs about “science”,
and each statement included the term “science” or “scientific”. There were
four sets of statements. The “simplicity” scale consisted of eight statements
that asked students whether knowledge consists of simple, discrete truths
or facts versus related ideas, for example, “Scientific knowledge is mainly
made up of discrete facts”. Twelve statements assessed students’ beliefs about
whether scientific truth is certain and relatively stable or changing (the “cer-
tainty” scale), for example, “Most questions in science have only one right
answer”. Nine statements elicited students’ beliefs about the scale to assess
justification of knowledge. Three statements focused on whether knowledge is
based on objective reality (e.g., “What is regarded as scientific truth is directly
knowable”.), three that scientific truth is more a matter of opinion than fact
(e.g., “There is really no way to determine whether good answers to scientific
problems have been discovered”.), and three that referred to scientific truth
as evaluated by agree-upon methods (e.g., “Scientific knowledge is based on
whether researchers consistently arrive at the same conclusions”.). Finally,
six statements elicited students’ acceptance of external authority (referred to
as “source”), for example, “A person can just accept answers from the experts
in this subject without question”.
2.3. ARABIC TRANSLATION
To eliminate the effects of variation in Omani students’ proficiency in
English, the U.S.-developed instrument was translated into classical Arabic.
Changes that were made would classify this as an adaptation in which
there are changes in wording to make the statements more appropriate
to the Omani culture (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). A native speaker
translated statements originally drafted in English into Arabic. In order to
ensure accuracy of the translation, the items were then back translated by
a second native speaker (the second author), and validated by additional
native speakers from the university. Final adjustments to the Arabic version
of the instrument conformed as closely as possible to both the conceptual
equivalence of Arabic and English words and local linguistic conventions.
In general, the translation posed few difficulties. Perhaps, the most impor-
tant change was the substitution of the Arabic word meaning “expert” for
the English “authority” because the latter would be interpreted in that cul-
ture to include political/social authorities as well as the intended scien-
tific ones. Substituting “expert” is therefore more precise in conveying the
intended meaning of the English term.
Additional alterations were:
• Use of the Arabic word that refers to “new information” instead of the
English “more information”
• Substitution of the Arabic term “separate” for the English “discrete” as
in “separate facts”
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• Use of an Arabic term for “opinion” that refers to a conclusion that
an individual comes to as opposed to a broadly held opinion
• Substitution of the Arabic term that refers to “the sciences” rather than
“the areas of science”
• Use of the Arabic word that conveys the slightly greater imperative of
“should” for the English “can” as in “A person can just accept answers
. . . ”.
2.4. PARTICIPANTS AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE
2.4.1. Omani Students
Omani participants were 231 students at Sultan Qaboos University (the
country’s only public university) located in the Muscat Region of the
Sultanate of Oman. The university has seven colleges (medicine and health
sciences, engineering, agricultural and marine sciences, science, commerce
and economics, education, and arts and social science) and a language cen-
ter. Students sampled lived in university residence halls that housed stu-
dents from families outside of the Muscat Region. Using an opportunity
sampling procedure, surveys were distributed to students by residence hall
supervisors. Of those who completed the surveys, slightly over half were
males (55%), and in their first year (59%) at the university. Because of resi-
dence hall policies, after their first year, male students are subsidized to live
off campus, but females remain in the dorms (a reflection of Omani cul-
ture). As a consequence, the dorm population consisted primarily of fresh-
man males and upper class-level females. This was reflected in the sample,
53% of which consisted of male freshmen and 38% sophomore and above
females. We examined the consequences of this difference and statistically
controlled for possible confounding effects.
Table I presents the distribution of Omani (and U.S.) students accord-
ing to their declared or intended major that in Oman also identified the
college in which they were enrolled. Because of our focus on epistemol-
ogy in science, we divided major fields according to their science content
(high, medium, or low) to determine, and potentially control for, between
country differences. After the first year of high school, students in Oman
are separated into the science stream or the arts stream. All those in the
science stream take courses in physics, chemistry, and biology. Given that
the first four colleges listed in Table I only admit students from the sci-
ence stream, we can assume they had considerably more science courses
than did students in the remaining colleges. Some of the science stream
students are eligible to enroll in humanities-based colleges; however, those
from the arts stream in high school cannot enroll in the science-based
colleges. We therefore designated students in the colleges of medicine,
engineering, agriculture, and science as having a more extensive science
background; those in commerce and economics to have a moderate amount
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Table I. Distribution of students by Omani and U.S. students’ declared or intended major
College Oman (%) U.S. (%) Sciencea
Medicine 5 4 High
Engineering 10 14 High
Agriculture 9 0 High
Science 17 12 High
Commerce & Economics 14 28 Moderate
Education 8 12 Low
Arts & Social Sciences 36 28 Low
Language Center 1
n 198b 151b
aRelative experience with science; coding Low = 1, Moderate = 2, High = 3.
bNote: Number of students who indicated their major or intended major.
of experience; and those in education, and arts and social sciences with the
least science background. It should also be noted that the science-based
and the commerce and economics colleges require English proficiency.
Students who need more English enroll simultaneously in the Language
Center.
2.4.2. U.S. Students
U.S. participants were 151 introductory psychology students at a selective
public university who participated to fulfill their research requirement. As
in Oman, slightly over half (55%) were males, and 40% were in their first
year. In contrast to the Omani sample, however, gender and year in college
were not associated. Racial ethnic distribution (of those reporting) con-
sisted of 60% Caucasian, 22% Asian American, 9% African American, 4%
Latino/a, and 5% other. Of those who reported their religious preference,
37% were Protestant, 23% Catholic, 11% Jewish, 5% Hindu, 1% Muslim,
and 1% Buddhist, with 22% describing themselves as agnostic, atheist, or
having no specific religion. The U.S. student sample is religiously heteroge-
neous, but virtually distinct from the Muslim dominated Omani sample.
As in Oman, U.S. students indicated their major (or intended major). For
purposes of comparison, this information was used to classify U.S. students
into groups that were approximately equivalent to the Omani categories.
According to this scheme, as shown in Table I, the distribution of students
according to science categories is 30% high, 28% moderate, and 40% low,
which is somewhat comparable (especially in the low science category) to the
Omani student distribution of 41%, 14%, and 44%, respectively.
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3. Results
3.1. DIMENSIONS OF EPISTEMIC BELIEFS
Omani and U.S. student responses to the 35 epistemology statements were
analyzed separately by country to create psychometrically acceptable scales
that represented the four intended knowledge and knowing belief dimen-
sions proposed by Hofer and Pintrich (1997). After initial principal com-
ponents extraction and varimax rotation, items that loaded appropriately
were retained and reanalyzed, including forcing a four-factor structure (the
initial extraction in both countries yielded 11 factors with eigenvalues
>1). Further scale refinement was then conducted to improve reliability
(Cronbach α), and items were retained that formed internally consistent
scales. Further factor analyses and rotation resulted in the sets of items
with salient factor loadings (> 0.40) for each factor, which are shown in
Table II. With few exceptions, final factor loadings and levels of inter-
nal consistency for the two countries are comparable. Reliability estimates
range from 0.44 to 0.70 (Mean = 0.54), which suggests that effects in the
present study may be somewhat underestimated due to the lower than
desired level of reliability, yet are comparable to estimates in other studies.
With regard to simple knowledge, the items that students responded to
most consistently were stated in reference to complexity rather than sim-
plicity. Similarly, on the certainty (stability) dimension, students responded
more consistently to items stated in terms of change rather than certainty.
For ease of interpretation, items on these two scales were reverse-coded
so that higher values represent the degree to which students believed that
knowledge is simple and certain, respectively. The factor best interpreted
as justification consists of items that focus on what could be summarized
as scientific methodology versus personal opinion, that is, belief in the
extent to which there is an objective reality that can be discovered by
reliable empirical means. The fourth factor, source, represents the degree
of belief in authority as the arbiter of what is true. For further analy-
sis, scales were computed by unit weighting the items (i.e., computing the
mean of responses where strongly disagree =1 through strongly agree =5,
with reversals as noted earlier). The resulting means and variances for these
scales are presented in Table II.
3.2. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN BELIEF DIMENSIONS
Table III presents correlations between the epistemology scales, with U.S.
students above the diagonal and Omani students below the diagonal.
As found in other studies, beliefs that knowledge is simple and certain
are significantly correlated for both Omani (r = 0.24, p < 0.001) and U.S.
students (r = 0.18, p < 0.05). As well, students in both countries with stro-
nger beliefs that justification of truth is based on agreed-upon observation
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Table III. Correlations among epistemic belief dimensions
for U.S. (above the diagonal) and Omani students (below
the diagonal)
Variable Simple Certain Justific. Source
Simple 0.18* −0.07 0.13
Certain 0.24*** 0.20* 0.24**
Justification −0.28*** −0.16* 0.17*




(i.e., justification) were more likely to trust authorities (i.e., source) in
Oman (r = 0.23, p < 0.001) and the U.S. (r = 0.17, p < 0.05). There were
also differences between countries, however, regarding the way certainty of
knowledge (i.e., degree of stability versus change) related to justification
and source. For U.S. students certainty of knowledge was directly related to
these dimensions: the less knowledge in the sciences was thought to change
(i.e., be the more certain), the more they believed truth is based on empir-
ical evidence and the more they trusted authorities. Whereas the opposite
held for Omani students; the more certain, the less they believed knowledge
was based on evidence or trusted authorities.
We also examined relations between epistemic beliefs and student char-
acteristics. A series of multiple regressions was employed to test the
independent predictive contribution of gender, year, and experience with
science to each of the four belief dimensions, separately by country.
Standardized regression coefficients and significance levels are presented
in Table IV. After controlling for year in school and exposure to sci-
ence, Omani men more so than women were more likely to believe that
knowledge is simple ( β = −0.19, p < 0.05). The effect was not signifi-
cant for U.S. students, although of comparable magnitude and direc-
tion. Effects of experience with science were similar for students in both
countries: the more experience the stronger both Omani ( β = 0.15, p <
0.05) and U.S. students (β = 0.22, p < 0.05) believed that scientific knowl-
edge was unchanging. Of note is that effects of gender and degree
of exposure to science-related curricula appear to have had compara-
ble associations for students in both countries. Such was not the case
for beliefs about the source of knowledge, which exhibit marked differ-
ences as a function of gender. Specifically, Omani men were more likely
to accept scientific authority than were women (β = −0.28, p < 0.01),
whereas if anything U.S. men were less likely to accede to authority
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Table IV. Regression analysis of personal epistemic beliefs as a function of student char-
acteristics
Student Epistemic belief dimension
characteristic
Simple Certain Justification Source
Oman U.S. Oman U.S. Oman U.S. Oman U.S.
Gender −0.19* −0.15 −0.07 −0.01 0.01 −0.09 −0.28** 0.09
Year −0.13 −0.10 0.10 −0.14 −0.02 0.00 −0.06 −0.11
Science −0.05 −0.01 0.15* 0.22* −0.02 −0.04 −0.08 0.05
R2 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.03




Note: Standardized regression coefficients are shown; gender is coded male = 1, female =
2; higher science values reflect having had more experience with science as inferred from
college major (range = 1–3).
(β = 0.09, ns). It should be emphasized these differences remained even
after controlling for year in school and experience with science. Finally, jus-
tification of knowledge (i.e., belief in empirical evidence) was not associated
with any of the measured student characteristics.
For the primary analysis, which tested for the effects of country and
gender, responses of Omani and U.S. students to the four epistemology
scales were analyzed simultaneously using a Country X Gender multi-
variate analysis of covariance, followed by separate univariate analyses of
covariance for each dimension, with year in school as a covariate. All
multivariate effects were statistically significant, indicating that students’
beliefs differed as a function of country (Fmult = 12.30, p < 0.001), gender
(Fmult = 3.25, p < 0.01), and the interaction between country and gender
(Fmult = 2.35, p < 0.05). As shown in Figure 1, distinctly different effects
were found for the four dimensions of epistemic beliefs. Specifically, Omani
more so than U.S. students were likely to believe that knowledge is sim-
ple and certain. Male more so than female students in both countries
believed that knowledge was simple, but there was no gender difference
with respect to whether knowledge was certain. There were no country
or gender effects for justification. Most important, however, the expected
interaction between country and gender was found (F(1,346) = 7.57,
p < 0.01). Whereas U.S. male and female students did not differ in their
reliance on authority, gender did matter in Oman. Controlling for year
in school, Omani men were more inclined to rely on authorities than











M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F
Oman U.S. Oman U.S. Oman U.S. Oman U.S.
Simple Certain Justification Source
Univariate Fs
Country (C) 15.21*** 19.42** <1.00 23.18***
Gender (G) 8.75*** <1.00 <1.00 4.06*
CXG < 1.00 <1.00 <1.00 7.57**
Multivariate Fs
Country (C) = 12.30*** Gender (G) = 3.25** CXG = 2.35*
*p <.05    **p <.01    ***p <.001
Figure 1. Epistemic beliefs of male (M) and female (M) Omani and U.S. university
students.
were Omani women. Overall, Omani students considered authorities more
important (F(1,346)=23.18, p<0.001); however, the effect is clearly attrib-
utable to differences between male rather than female students in the two
countries. It should be noted that the Country X Gender interaction con-
firms what was inferred from differences between Omani and U.S. students’
regression coefficients for gender and source described previously (see
Table IV).
4. Discussion
We found detectable differences between aggregate responses of Omani and
U.S. university students on three of the four dimensions of epistemic beliefs
measured in the present study. The most important effects concern beliefs
about authority, which of the epistemological dimensions measured in the
present study is most closely linked to cultural characteristics of the two
countries. This suggests that because of the more authoritarian structure
of their society, Omani more so than U.S. students in general were will-
ing to accept authorities’ statements about scientific knowledge. The coun-
try difference was clearly a function of gender, however, in that Omani men
were more accepting than were Omani women, a difference that was absent
in U.S. students. More acceptance of authority by Omani men is consistent
with their greater participation in political and religious affairs. As we con-
jectured, their experiences in authority-rich contexts in which others pro-
fess what is true, especially in the mosques, may create habits of reliance
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on others, which generalizes to the domain of science. This interpreta-
tion supports the connection between general culture-based interpersonal
relations and learning depicted by Schommer-Aikins’s (2004) embedded
systemic model of epistemic beliefs, in which asymmetrical interpersonal
relations generalize to beliefs in certain knowledge domains and
ultimately how students approach learning.
At the outset it was also uncertain whether Omani women college stu-
dents would be more or less likely to accept authorities. As with Omani
men they too are exposed to asymmetric interpersonal relations, albeit not
to the same extent as Omani men in religious activities or other areas of
Omani society (Rassekh, 2004). One reason why Omani women were less
accepting of authorities may be attributable to selection factors – these
represent the highly achieving women selected to attend the university.
As summarized by Rassekh (2004) public policy has markedly accelerated
Omani women’s involvement in education. Possibly those taking advantage
of increased opportunity are independent thinkers and more accomplished
in general because of having overcome societal barriers to success. Obser-
vations by Strommer (2001) that “Beneath their black abayas and head
scarves, most students were confident, assertive, and inquisitive [and] did
not hesitate to seek information or assistance – or to let us know exactly
how they felt about courses, instructors, or campus rules” (para. 2) sup-
ports this view of Omani women college students. More in-depth studies of
Omani women, similar to studies of women in other cultures are suggested
along the lines of those involving gender in the U.S. (e.g., Baxter-Magolda,
1992; Clinchy, 2002).
Our interpretation of the moderating effects of gender on country differ-
ences, or from the other perspective, of country on gender differences,
suggests further studies that assess student characteristics that are indi-
cated by the inferred cultural experiences. Most important would be to
directly measure cultural and gender differences in the degree to which
students have experienced authority. We could then test whether compar-
isons between cultures that differ in perceived salience of authority medi-
ate differences in epistemic beliefs. This may also reveal relationships within
each culture in much the same manner that individualism–collectivism
accounts for variance within as well as between cultures (e.g., Triandis,
1995). Beyond such statistical comparisons, however, is the need to: (a) fur-
ther examine in much greater depth students’ experiences with and views
of authority in general, and (b) whether and in what ways those experi-
ences transfer (or do not transfer) to beliefs about knowledge in the sci-
ences or other knowledge domains. In other words, more qualitative and
phenomenological information is necessary for an in-depth examination of
the issues suggested by the quantitative findings, similar to Al-Salhi’s (2001)
approach with Saudi Arabian students. Recent work by Raviv et al. (2003)
on students’ views of teachers as epistemic authorities is especially relevant.
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With respect to other dimensions of epistemology, Omani more so than
U.S. students believed that knowledge was both simple and certain. This
is consistent with Qian and Pan (2002) who found that Chinese more
than American students’ believed that knowledge is simple and certain.
Given the limited number of comparable studies it is difficult to know the
extent to which this difference is generalizable, and even if so, whether it
is attributable to cultural differences. In the present study, for example, in
both Oman and the U.S., simplicity and certainty were directly related to
students’ experiences with science, or at least the degree to which they were
in science curricula (see Table IV). This suggests that differences between
cultures, such as found by Qian and Pan, may be explained by the relative
degree of familiarity with science content and methodology. Accordingly,
inclusion of domain familiarity should be assessed in subsequent studies
to explore this possibility. Gender differences were evident for simplicity of
knowledge. However, they were consistent across cultures. The absence of
gender differences for certainty (as well as justification) is also consistent.
Thus, the interaction between country and gender was absent from simple,
certain, and justification dimensions of personal epistemic beliefs.
The relative absence of evidence about epistemic beliefs in Middle Eastern
cultures, as compared to that available for Western and Asian cultures, invites
further investigation. Challenges for future research include instrumentation
equivalence and translation, even though there were few manifestly difficult
translation problems in the present study. We believe that authority and gen-
der are critical dimensions to study. But others require further attention as
well, such as religiosity and even fundamentalism, which may be related to
authoritarian worldviews (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). Ideal conditions
for assessing such effects would be those in which cultures are in close prox-
imity and share common or contiguous environments, such as currently exists
in Israel, although with due regard to the differences between multi-cultural
and mono-cultural contexts.
Also needed are further tests of the Hofer and Pintrich (2002) model of
epistemic beliefs. Although measurement issues remain, and scale reliabilities
in the present study were lower than desired, the dimensions assessed were
conceptually clear compared to Al-Salhi’s (2001) application of Schommer’s
Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire. In agreement with Youn (1997), who
found two factors with samples from South Korea and the U.S., one of
Al-Salhi’s dimensions combined simple, certain knowledge and authority,
and the other, active learning. Such reliance solely on exploratory factor
analysis, which can be a blunt instrument that homogenizes conceptual dis-
tinctions, would have failed to detect important effects in the present study.
A combination of confirmatory analytic approaches and attention to con-
struct validity is called for in future studies that adopt Hofer and Pintrich’s
model, which has much to recommend in appropriately assessing students’
epistemological beliefs.
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Notes
1Terms used to describe areas of the world are not always consistent between or even
within various literatures. The term Middle Eastern in the present context will refer to
predominant Middle Eastern Muslim cultures, recognizing the regions’ cultural-religious
heterogeneity, in particular the State of Israel, and differences in the degree of religiosity
among ostensibly Muslim-dominated countries.
2In addition to specific references provided, information about Oman was compiled from
reports of the United Nations, U.S. Department of State, and Sultanate of Oman publi-
cations, especially the Oman Ministry of Higher Education Book of Statistics 2001–2002
(2002). Descriptions of the culture and educational system are also based on personal
experiences of the second author (Moosa) who served as Director, Educational Research
Center, College of Education, Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat, Oman.
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